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The juvenile justice community applauded the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Miller v. Alabama,1 which struck down mandatory life 
without parole sentences for all juvenile homicide offenders.2  No longer 
will courts be required to condemn to death in prison persons not yet 
adults for homicides committed in their youth.3  Instead, sentencers now 
must consider the mitigating factors that are the essence of childhood 
and adolescence and that animate the lives of young offenders.4  In this 
respect, the Court followed Graham v. Florida5 and once again traversed 
 
 
* Professor of Law, Director of Clinical Programs, and Director of Juvenile Justice Clinic, William 
S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 
† I want to thank the Boyd School of Law for its financial support, and I am especially grateful for 
the invaluable assistance of our library director, Jeanne Price, and my research assistant, Laura 
Welzig. 
         1.      132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) 
         2.     See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court Bans Mandatory Life-Without- Parole Sentences for 
Children   Convicted of Homicide, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (June 25, 2012), 
http://www.eji.org/eji/node/646; Supreme Court Rules Mandatory JLWOP Unconstitutional, NAT’L 
JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR, http://www.njdc.info/news.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
 3.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 4.  Id. at 2467-68. 
 5.  130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
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the divide between capital and noncapital cases,6 granting to noncapital 
defendants the individualized consideration in sentencing historically 
reserved for those facing the death penalty.7 
To be sure, this is an advance for those facing the harshest of all 
penalties for the young.  But it is only a step forward.8  The Miller Court 
opted for the narrower of two rulings sought by petitioners Evan Miller 
and Kuntrell Jackson.9  Instead of striking down all life without parole 
sentences for juveniles as cruel and unusual, the Court merely banned 
the mandatory imposition of that harshest of all penalties constitutionally 
permissible for minors convicted of murder.10  Thus, it remains 
constitutional even for fourteen-year-olds like Evan Miller and Kuntrell 
Jackson to be sentenced to life without parole, so long as they receive 
individualized consideration at sentencing.11  Given the developmental 
factors setting juveniles apart from adults, as recognized first by Roper 
v. Simmons12 in 2005 and then by Graham13 five years later, the 
requirement that those who sentence consider young defendants’ 
individual histories is an important development. 
History has shown, however, that the individualized consideration 
now required before sentencing our young to death in prison is no friend 
to youth.14  Before the Supreme Court banned the death penalty for those 
under eighteen years of age, it had long required each of the youthful 
offenders who populated death row (or were executed before Roper) to 
receive the same individualized consideration the Court has now 
mandated before the imposition of a sentence of life without parole on a 
 
 6.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463-64 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022). 
 7.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467-68 (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993); Sumner 
v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 74-76 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982); Lockett 
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597-609 (1978) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
 8.  See David R. Dow, Don’t Believe the Hype: Supreme Court Decision on Juvenile Life 
Without Parole Is Weak, THE DAILY BEAST (June 25, 2012, 5:38 PM EDT), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/25/don-t-believe-the-hype-supreme-court-decision-
on-juvenile-life-without-parole-is-weak.html (criticizing the ruling as being “tepid and narrow,” 
failing “to do anything morally important,” and representing “incrementalism at its worst” and 
opining that “you have to have awfully low standards to think this decision marks much by way of 
progress when it comes to criminal punishment.”). 
 9.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-30 Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 10-9646), 2011 
WL 5322568 at *9-29; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-25, 31-35 Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 
2455 (2012) (No. 10-9647), 2011 WL 5322575 at *8-25, *31-35.  The Supreme Court consolidated 
Jackson with Miller for decision.  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455.  
 10.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-71 (2005). 
 13.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026-27 (2010). 
 14.  See infra text accompanying notes 151-206. 
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juvenile.15  After considering the mitigating factors owing to their youth, 
none of the juvenile offenders in these cases were saved from society’s 
harshest penalty.16  There is little reason to believe that Evan Miller or 
Kuntrell Jackson will fare any better.  With its narrow ruling, Miller has 
taken the Eighth Amendment kids are different jurisprudence on a 
deleterious detour that could lead Miller and Jackson and others like 
them to a certain dead end. 
Where Miller went wrong is the subject of this paper.  It begins 
with Graham and the significance of the Court’s ruling that the Eighth 
Amendment categorically precludes imposition of a sentence of life 
without parole on a juvenile nonhomicide offender.  Next, this paper 
turns to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, parsing the Court’s 
reliance on precedent and the reasoning that led it to adopt a ruling that 
stops short of a categorical ban on life without parole for all juvenile 
homicide offenders.  This paper then launches a critique of Miller, 
arguing that it is both unprincipled and unsound because of its failure to 
rule categorically that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of 
life without parole on a juvenile regardless of the crime.  This paper 
concludes by offering as an explanation for the Court’s limited ruling the 
judicial minimalism that characterizes the Roberts Court and by 
explaining how minimalism fails the criminal justice system in this case. 
I. THE SETTING: GRAHAM V. FLORIDA 
The Supreme Court’s landmark 2010 decision, Graham v. 
Florida,17 set the stage for Miller.  Like Miller, Graham was a challenge 
to a noncapital sentence—a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile 
nonhomicide offender.18  To grant relief to those juvenile offenders, the 
Court first had to stare down its noncapital Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence and forge an alternate route.19  The reigning precedent for 
 
 15.  See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (requiring sentencing court 
to consider as mitigating circumstances defendant’s troubled upbringing and youth, including an 
alcoholic mother who prostituted herself and a father who used excessive physical punishment, and 
his own emotional disturbance and delayed cognitive development).  See generally Mary 
Berkheiser, Capitalizing Adolescence: Juvenile Offenders on Death Row, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 135 
(2005) (cataloging peer involvement in crimes and related information for the seventy-two juvenile 
offenders on death row at the time of the Roper decision). 
 16.  Berkheiser, supra note 15. 
 17.  130 S. Ct. at 2011. 
 18.  Id. at 2017-18. 
 19.  See Mary Berkheiser, Death Is Not So Different After All: Graham v. Florida and the 
Court’s ‘Kids Are Different’ Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 36 VT. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (2011) 
(analyzing the Court’s first ever reliance on death penalty cases to decide an Eighth Amendment 
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the Supreme Court’s noncapital Eighth Amendment jurisprudence was 
then and remains today Harmelin v. Michigan,20 which abandoned the 
three-part proportionality analysis adopted by Solem v. Helm21 and 
established a “gross disproportionality” standard as the threshold 
consideration.22  In the more than two decades between Harmelin and 
Graham, the Supreme Court had applied Harmelin only twice, ruling in 
both cases that sentences of twenty-five years to life for minor property 
offenses under California’s “three strikes” law were not grossly 
disproportionate and, therefore, passed constitutional muster.23 
Graham rejected Harmelin’s niggardly approach and plotted a 
different course.24  In an historic stride, the Graham Court applied the 
thorough-going analysis traditionally reserved for death penalty cases to 
the life without parole sentence Terrence Graham had received for the 
crime of armed burglary.25  The Court did so, it said, because Graham 
had challenged an entire sentencing practice and not just the sentence 
imposed on him.26  Thus, the proper analysis was that employed in other 
cases establishing categorical rules, even though all of those cases had 
 
challenge to a noncapital sentence); Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right 
to Age-Appropriate Sentencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 457, 459 (2012) (commenting on the 
“death is different” jurisprudence requiring that “capital sentences are reviewed with extremely 
careful scrutiny” while review of noncapital cases has been “‘so deferential to state interests as to 
make Eighth Amendment challenges to excessive incarceration essentially non-starters’”) (quoting 
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall? The Effect of Eighth 
Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 155, 184 (2008)).  See also Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational 
Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 689, 713-14 (1995) (stating “the ‘death is different’ campaign of 
opponents of capital punishment [has] won capital defendants certain additional protections, but 
only at the considerable cost of lumping together all other penalties under the rubric of ‘noncapital’ 
punishments, thereby effectively shielding incarceration from constitutional scrutiny.”). 
 20.  501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 21.  463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983) (setting out three factors to guide noncapital proportionality 
review: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) comparison of the 
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) comparison of the sentences 
imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions).  See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 (opinion by 
Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (explicitly rejecting the Solem three-part test). 
 22. Harmelin, 501 U.S at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (concluding that to get to the 
intrastate and interstate comparisons required by Solem, the Court first had to determine that the 
sentence was “grossly disproportionate” to the crime). 
 23.  See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (stating that the gross disproportionality 
principle was to be reserved for the “extraordinary case,” and Andrade’s two consecutive terms of 
twenty-five years to life for shoplifting videotapes valued at approximately $150 was not such a 
case); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that Ewing’s 
twenty-five years to life sentence for stealing golf clubs valued at slightly less than $1,200 was long, 
but not grossly disproportionate). 
 24.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022-23 (2010). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 2022. 
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involved the death penalty.27  Of the three most recent cases adopting 
categorical rules, the first was Atkins v. Virginia,28 in which the Court 
ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the death penalty for a 
mentally retarded individual.  The second case, Roper v. Simmons,29 
held similarly that executing one who committed his crime before the 
age of eighteen was cruel and unusual and, therefore, unconstitutional.  
Finally, Kennedy v. Louisiana30 established that the death penalty for the 
rape of a child was off-limits under the Eighth Amendment.  All three 
cases, like Graham, were categorical challenges to sentences imposed on 
a certain category of offenders or for a certain category of offenses.  The 
fact that all three were death penalty cases did not give the Graham 
Court pause because what mattered was that the challenge embraced all 
juveniles as a category of nonhomicide offenders.31 
Following Graham’s lead, Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson raised 
categorical challenges to the mandatory life without parole sentences 
they received after being convicted of murder.32  They also challenged 
the mandatory nature of their life without parole sentences.33  Although 
the Court ultimately ruled in their favor, they did not receive the full 
measure of relief they had sought.  Nor did the Court’s decision live up 
to the promise of Roper and Graham’s kids are different Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
II. THE DECISION 
The Miller Court began and ended its legal analysis by looking to 
Roper and Graham.  Front and center in that analysis was the 
proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment.34  The Court 
quoted Roper for the century-old “‘precept of justice that punishment for 
a crime should be graduated and proportioned’ to both the offender and 
the offense.”35  Only in this way, the Court declared, is the Eighth 
 
 27.  Id. at 2022-23. 
 28.  536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 29.  543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 30.  554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 31.  See Guggenheim, supra note 19, at 461 (arguing that, given the weaknesses in Justice 
Kennedy’s finding of a national consensus against the use of life without parole for juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders, “[o]ne can confidently say . . . that the majority felt strongly that this 
punishment is morally wrong.”). 
 32.  Miller Petition, supra note 9, at 9-25; Jackson Petition, supra note 9, at 8-25. 
 33.  Miller Petition, supra note 9, at 26-29; Jackson Petition, supra note 9, at 31-35. 
 34.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021). 
 35.  Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 560 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 
(1910)). 
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Amendment right of every individual “not to be subjected to excessive 
sanctions” guaranteed.36 
With proportionality as its lodestar, the Court then pivoted to two 
strands of sentencing precedent.37  As it had done for the first time in 
Graham,38 the Court looked to its death penalty jurisprudence for 
guidance in this non-death case.39  Turning first to its cases that had 
adopted categorical prohibitions on sentencing, the Court cited its most 
recent trilogy of capital cases, in which it had put the death penalty off-
limits for mentally retarded persons,40 for juvenile offenders,41 and for 
the crime of raping a child.42  The Court then recognized that, with 
Graham, it had held that the same categorical bar applied to the 
noncapital sentence of life without parole for nonhomicide offenses 
imposed on juvenile offenders.43  In part, because Graham had “likened 
life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty,”44 the Miller Court 
extended its reach into death penalty law by embracing a second line of 
precedents that barred mandatory death sentences and required 
individualized consideration of the details of both the offender and the 
offense.45  It was the “confluence of these two lines of precedent” that 
led the Court to conclude that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide 
offenders.46 
The Court took care to demonstrate that the principles that first 
 
 36.  Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 560). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See Berkheiser, Death Is Not So Different, supra note 19, at 5-7 (discussing the Court’s 
original reliance on death penalty cases to decide an Eighth Amendment challenge to a non-death 
case); Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “Death is Different” No Longer: Graham v. Florida and the 
Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 327 (2010) 
(discussing the Court’s decision in Graham to apply the categorical approach to a noncapital case); 
Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Redemption Song: Graham v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86 (2010) (noting application of 
categorical exclusions to nonhomicide offenses committed by juveniles). 
 39.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463-64. 
 40.  Id. at 2463 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)). 
 41.  Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)). 
 42.  Id. (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)). 
 43.  Id. (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 2455 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality 
opinion) (striking down mandatory death penalty because it did not permit consideration of 
individual characteristics of the offender or the circumstances of the offense and excluded from 
consideration “the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586 (1978) (plurality opinion) (striking down Ohio death penalty statute because it did not permit 
the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the Eighth Amendment). 
 46.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
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guided Roper and then Graham applied with equal force to life without 
parole sentences for homicides: “none of what [Graham] said about 
children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and 
environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”47  However, the Court 
stopped short of the categorical ruling it rendered in Graham.  The Court 
announced that although “Graham’s reasoning implicates any life-
without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile, . . . its categorical ban 
relates only to nonhomicide offenses.”48  Instead of a categorical ruling 
against all life without parole sentences for juveniles, the Court adopted 
a ban only on the mandatory imposition of such sentences.49 
As the foundation for that ban, the Court cataloged in detail what 
has now become unassailable—that juveniles are “constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of sentencing.”50  Calling upon Roper 
and Graham, the Court recognized, as those cases had, “three significant 
gaps between juveniles and adults”: 51 first, juveniles lack maturity and a 
developed sense of responsibility, leading to “recklessness, impulsivity, 
and heedless risk-taking”;52 second, juveniles are more vulnerable to 
peer pressures and other negative influences and cannot leave their often 
terrible home environments;53 and third, juveniles’ characters are not as 
established as adults’.54  These differences, the Court said, cause 
juveniles to have diminished culpability and stronger prospects for 
reform than adults, and thus make them “less deserving of the most 
severe punishments.”55  Nonetheless, after the Court’s ruling, all 
juveniles convicted of homicides still may face a sentence of life without 
parole, which means certain death in prison.  The difference pre- and 
post-Miller is in the details. 
The rationale for the Court’s rejection of the categorical ruling 
sought by both Miller and Jackson is not transparent,56 but the reason for 
 
 47.  Id. at 2465. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 2475. 
 50.  Id. at 2464. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 2465 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010)).  The Court noted that its 
decisions concerning juvenile sentencing rest not only on common sense but on science and social 
science as well.  Id. at 2464-65 & n.5 (citing Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3-4 Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 
174239 at *3-4; Brief for J. Lawrence Aber et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12-28 
Miller, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 195300 at *12-28). 
 56.  The Court’s jurisprudential approach of adopting a narrower rule that decided the cases 
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striking down mandatory life without parole sentences is clear: 
mandatory sentencing schemes prevent the sentencer from considering 
the offender’s status as a juvenile and all that entails.57  Such sentencing 
with blinders on, the Court explained, contravenes the foundational 
principle of both Roper and Graham “that imposition of a State’s most 
severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they 
were not children.”58 
Among the factors that must be considered at capital sentencing, 
the Court said, are the “‘mitigating qualities of youth.’”59  The Court 
relied, in particular, on its decision thirty years earlier in Eddings v. 
Oklahoma.60  In Eddings, a sixteen-year old shot and killed a police 
officer and was sentenced to death.  The Court overturned his death 
sentence, reasoning that the sentencing judge did not consider his 
“neglectful and violent family background (including his mother’s 
alcoholism and his father’s physical abuse) and his emotional 
disturbance.”61  The Court noted that Eddings found such evidence more 
relevant for sentencing a youthful defendant than an adult because “‘just 
as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor 
of great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional 
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered’ in assessing 
his culpability.”62 
The Court was troubled that, absent consideration of the mitigating 
features of adolescence, every juvenile convicted of homicide, regardless 
of age or level of participation in the crime, would receive the same 
sentence as “the vast majority of adults committing similar homicide 
 
before it without making a sweeping pronouncement enjoys a long history in the jurisprudence of 
the Court.  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 4, 8, 17-19 (1999) (explaining the “legitimate role” of the Supreme Court in our 
constitutional order and the philosophical approach identified as “decisional minimalism,” which 
eschews ambitious theoretical doctrines and strives to do no more than is necessary to decide cases).  
See infra text accompanying notes 207-217. 
 57.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466-68 (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) 
(recognizing necessity of considering youth in capital sentencing decisions); Sumner v. Shuman, 
483 U.S. 66, 75-76 (1987) (prohibiting mandatory death penalty for murderers already serving life 
without parole); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982) (vacating death sentence where 
state courts had refused to consider defendant’s youth and his “unhappy upbringing” and emotional 
disturbance as mitigating factors); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 597-609 (1978) (plurality 
opinion) (requiring judges and juries to consider all mitigating evidence)). 
 58.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. 
 59.  Id. at 2467 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
 60.  Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
 61.  Id. (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115). 
 62.  Id. (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116). 
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offenses.”63  This is so because even though adults are subject to the 
death penalty in many jurisdictions, “very few offenders actually receive 
that sentence.”64  Thus, mandatory life without parole subjects juvenile 
homicide offenders to “the same nominal punishment as almost all 
adults, even though the two classes differ significantly in moral 
culpability and capacity for change.”65  Even then, the penalty imposed 
on an adolescent is “‘the same . . . in name only’”66 as the penalty 
imposed on an adult because an adolescent will serve “‘more years and a 
greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.’”67  
Having recognized the demonstrable lack of proportionality inherent in 
those mandatory sentences, the Court held that “the Eighth Amendment 
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without 
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”68 
With that holding, the Court finished defining the law.69  Because 
striking down mandatory life without parole was “sufficient to decide 
[the] cases,”70 the Court did not consider Miller and Jackson’s broader 
argument for a categorical ban on juvenile life without parole, either for 
all juveniles or for those fourteen and under.71  Thus, it remains possible 
for a juvenile to receive a sentence of life without parole after the 
sentencer has heard the juvenile homicide offender’s complete 
mitigation story.  The Court did not rule out that possibility; indeed, it 
appeared to anticipate some such sentences: “[W]e think appropriate 
occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will 
be uncommon.”72 
Having announced its ruling, the Court quickly dispatched the 
arguments of the States of Alabama and Arkansas.73  First, the Court 
distinguished cases involving juveniles sentenced to life without parole 
 
 63.  Id. at 2468. 
 64.  Id. n.7 (citing Sean Rosenmerkel, Matthew Durose & Donald F. Farole Jr., Felony 
Sentences in State Courts, 2006 – Statistical Tables, 28 Table 4.4, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Rev. 
Nov. 22, 2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf). 
 65.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 n.7.  See Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge 
Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99 (2010) (advocating an end to prosecuting juveniles as 
adults and arguing that the focus should be on allowing juveniles to prove that the mistakes they 
made no longer define them). 
 66.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010)). 
 67.  Id. (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028). 
 68.  Id. at 2469. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 2469-75 (noting the dissenters’ assertion of the same arguments). 
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from other non-death penalty cases, which are governed by the “gross 
disproportionality” rule of Harmelin.74  The Court stated that Harmelin 
“had nothing to do with children and did not purport to apply its holding 
to the sentencing of juvenile offenders.”75  While Harmelin recognized 
that “‘death is different,’”76 Miller recognized that “children are 
different too,”77 and that difference had led the Court “on multiple 
occasions” to hold that “a sentencing rule permissible for adults may not 
be so for children.”78  Therefore, those cases, and not Harmelin, 
governed Miller’s and Jackson’s sentences.79 
Again the Court held fast to its insistence that youth matters for 
purposes of sentencing when it rejected the States’ argument that the 
Court could not hold the sentences here unconstitutional because no 
national consensus against them existed.80  The Court found that 
argument weaker than in Graham because, unlike Graham and Roper, 
the Miller decision did not categorically ban a penalty but only 
mandated a certain sentencing process.81  Moreover, the number of 
states permitting life without parole for the juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders addressed by Graham was greater by ten than the number 
imposing mandatory life without parole on juveniles convicted of 
 
 74.  Id. at 2470 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id.  (“Indeed, it is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of exception for 
children.”). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 2471. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id.  The Court did not address the question whether Miller will apply retroactively, but its 
characterization of its decision as mandating a certain sentencing process, not banning a particular 
penalty, could be significant.  Following the rule laid out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), if 
the Supreme Court announces a new rule, that rule will not be applied retroactively unless it falls 
within one of two exceptions.  Id. at 307.  Only the first exception is relevant here.  That exception 
includes “rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of 
their status or offense.”  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989), overruled on other grounds 
by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  Thus, if Miller’s ruling that life without parole cannot 
be imposed on juveniles mandatorily is interpreted as a prohibition of a “certain category of 
punishment,” Miller will be applied retroactively.  If that ruling is seen as merely a procedural 
change in how life without parole is imposed on minors, it will not apply retroactively.  See Laurie 
Levenson, Retroactivity of Cases on Criminal Defendants’ Rights, NAT’L L.J. 26 (Aug. 13, 2012) 
(suggesting that if the retroactivity record of Graham v. Florida is a guide, the courts will not 
unanimously embrace retroactivity for Miller).  See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Juvenile Life-Without-
Parole Case Means Courts Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A. JOURNAL (Aug. 8, 2012 
8:30 AM CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_juvenile_life-without-
parole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen/ (predicting that the Supreme Court will have to 
resolve the retroactivity question and opining that Miller made a substantive change in the law and 
therefore should be applied retroactively). 
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murder, as in Miller.82  Considering the facts, the Court concluded that it 
was “breaking no new ground in these cases.”83 
Finally, the Court explained why the presence of discretion in some 
jurisdictions’ provisions for transfer of a juvenile to adult court has 
“limited utility” for the later sentencing determination.84  At such an 
early pretrial stage, judges typically have limited information about 
either the offender or the offense.85  In addition, the choices available at 
the transfer stage are stark: remain in juvenile court and be released in a 
matter of months or years or go to adult criminal court and face being 
sentenced to life without parole, as in the cases before the Court.86  In 
adult court, the possible sentences do not represent such extremes: rather 
than life without parole, one could be sentenced to life with parole or a 
long term of years.87  Because of those differences, the Court concluded: 
“the discretion available to a judge at the transfer stage cannot substitute 
for discretion at post-trial sentencing in adult court – and so cannot 
satisfy the Eighth Amendment.”88 
In the end, it was Graham, Roper, and the Court’s individualized 
sentencing decisions that carried the day for Evan Miller and Kuntrell 
Jackson.89  Going forward, the Court said, “a judge or jury must have the 
opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the 
harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”90  Because the mandatory 
 
 82.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (stating that thirty-nine jurisdictions permitted the sentence 
prohibited by Graham, whereas twenty-nine jurisdictions imposed mandatory life without parole 
sentences on juvenile murderers). 
 83.  Id. at 2472. 
 84.  Id. at 2474 (observing that in about half of the relevant jurisdictions, some juvenile 
homicide offenders are transferred to adult court automatically, without any discretionary review by 
the juvenile court, and in several states the decision is a matter of pure prosecutorial discretion with 
no opportunity for judicial review). 
 85.  Id.  See Arya, supra note 65, at 130-31 (arguing that, even with the best information, 
judges and experts have difficulty assessing the culpability and maturity of youth). 
 86.  132 S. Ct. at 2474-75. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 2475. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id.  By referring to “imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles,” the Court 
again anticipates that some juvenile offenders will receive a sentence of life without parole, even 
after the individualized sentencing required by the Court’s ruling.  Id.  Juvenile homicide offenders 
will face a high hurdle because no right to counsel exists for those new sentencing hearings, as they 
would occur in a state post-conviction setting.  See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1326 (2012) 
(confirming absence of constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings); 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (same).  The perils of proceeding without counsel 
have aroused a call for a “moral right to counsel” in these cases.  See Editorial, A Moral Right to 
Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, at A22 (“And not just any lawyer. . . . The hearings will require 
lawyers with training in psychology and human development to argue convincingly that an 
offender’s record supports reducing a life sentence—including what Justice Elena Kagan, in her 
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sentencing schemes in Alabama and Arkansas had condemned Miller 
and Jackson to die in prison, they violated the principle of 
proportionality and the ban on cruel and unusual punishment contained 
in the Eighth Amendment.91 
With its ruling, the Court reaffirmed what Roper and Graham have 
told us: First, kids are different from adults in ways that diminish their 
culpability for the crimes of their youth.  Second, those differences apply 
to everyone below the age of eighteen.  Third, nothing in Roper and 
Graham suggests that the distinctive traits and vulnerabilities of 
juveniles are more or less salient depending on the seriousness of the 
crime.  Instead, what is true about our youth applies with equal force to 
the worst of crimes, like the homicides of which Evan Miller and 
Kuntrell Jackson were convicted.92  Having embraced all of those 
principles, the Court’s detour around a categorical rule against all life 
 
majority opinion, called a juvenile offender’s ‘immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity’ at the 
time of the crime”). 
 91.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455, 2475.  Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, with 
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joining.  Justice Breyer also filed a concurring 
opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.  He wrote to add the point that, if the State continues to 
seek a sentence of life without parole for Kuntrell Jackson, a determination whether he “kill[ed] or 
intend[ed] to kill” the robbery victim will have to be made, based on Graham’s “clear rule: The 
only juveniles who may constitutionally be sentenced to life without parole are those convicted of 
homicide offenses who ‘kill or intend to kill.’”  Id. at 2476 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Graham 
v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010)).  Three dissenting opinions were filed.  In the first, Chief 
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, concluded that “[n]either the text of 
the Constitution nor our precedent prohibits legislatures from requiring that juvenile murderers be 
sentenced to life without parole.”  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Justice 
Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, expressed his perennial disagreement with the notion of an Eighth 
Amendment proportionality principle, contending that there is no such thing.  Id. at 2483 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting).  Writing more broadly, Justice Thomas condemned the majority for relying on 
precedents that are inconsistent with or “have no basis in the original understanding of the Eighth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 2484 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Finally, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia, 
decried the majority’s willingness to countermand democratic decision-making and establish Eighth 
Amendment principles that “are no longer tied to objective indicia of society’s standards.” Id. at 
2490 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 92.  See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 84 (1998) (“Doctrines of 
diminished responsibility have their greatest impact when large injuries have been caused by actors 
not fully capable of understanding and self-control. . . . if the doctrine of diminished responsibility 
means anything in relation to the punishment of immature offenders, its impact cannot be limited to 
trivial cases.  Diminished responsibility is either generally applicable or generally unpersuasive as a 
mitigating principle.”); Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons 
for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 9, 43-
44 (2008) (“Juveniles’ criminal responsibility is just as diminished when states sentence them to life 
without parole (LWOP) as it is when it executes them.  Although the Court’s capital punishment 
jurisprudence insists that ‘death is different,’ there is no principled penal basis to distinguish 
between juveniles’ diminished responsibility that precludes the death penalty from their equally 
reduced culpability for other severe sentences”). 
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without parole sentences for juveniles is perplexing.  Worse yet, it is 
unprincipled and unsound. 
III. UNPRINCIPLED 
Miller is unprincipled because it purports to embrace both Roper 
and Graham while rendering a decision that veers far from the principles 
of those cases.  Miller’s departure from the precedents finds the 
foundation for its narrow ruling in the fact that Graham’s “flat ban on 
life without parole applied only to nonhomicide crimes.”93  But while 
Graham limited its holding to nonhomicide offenses,94 the Miller Court 
was not constrained by that ruling.  Indeed, in both cases before the 
Court, the petitioners asked the Court to extend its categorical 
prohibition to life without parole for homicides committed by 
juveniles.95  Miller declined the invitation without considering the 
question.96 
Miller also asserts that Graham “took care to distinguish those 
[nonhomicide] offenses from murder.”97  It is true that Graham 
distinguished the more serious crime of murder from nonhomicide 
offenses.98  However, it did so as a building block of its foundation for 
recognizing the “twice diminished moral culpability” of a juvenile 
offender who did not kill, as compared to an adult murderer.99  As the 
Court explained, “[t]he age of the offender and the nature of the crime 
each bear on the analysis.”100  Thus, even for juveniles who commit 
murder, their moral culpability compared to adults remains diminished 
by their age (though not by their crime), and they, therefore, are still less 
 
 93.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
 94.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.  Of course, the only crimes before the Court at that time 
were nonhomicide offenses.  See id. 
 95.  Miller Petition, supra note 9, at 9-25; Jackson Petition, supra note 9, at 8-25. 
 96.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (“Because that holding [that the Eighth Amendment forbids 
mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders] is sufficient to decide these cases, 
we do not consider Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires 
a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger”). 
 97.  Id. at 2465. 
 98.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) and 
holding that death penalty for rape of a child violates Eighth Amendment); Tison v. Arizona, 481 
U.S. 137 (1987) (holding that the death penalty for one whose participation in felony resulting in 
murder was major and whose mental state was reckless indifference did not violate Eighth 
Amendment); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that death penalty for one who does 
not kill or intends to kill violates Eighth Amendment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) 
(holding that death penalty for rape of adult woman violated Eighth Amendment)). 
 99.  Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2027. 
 100.  Id. 
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deserving, as a categorical matter, of the most severe punishments.101 
Graham did not answer the question of what “once diminished 
moral culpability” would mean for juvenile homicide offenders because 
that question was not before the Court.102  Perhaps it would mean 
exactly what Miller ruled: that mandatory life without parole sentences 
for juvenile homicide offenders violate the Eighth Amendment, and that 
those offenders must receive individualized consideration at their 
sentencing hearings.103  The problem for Miller is that nothing in the 
Court’s juvenile sentencing precedents suggested such a result.  Indeed, 
both Roper and Graham rejected in no uncertain terms the case-by-case 
individualized sentencing process now mandated by Miller.104  As the 
following shows, Miller’s full-throated endorsement of a sentencing 
process roundly denounced by its predecessors is devoid of principle and 
lacks any moral grounding. 
We begin with Roper.  There, the Court considered and rejected the 
State of Missouri’s argument that the Court’s adoption of a categorical 
rule barring the death penalty for offenders under eighteen was 
“arbitrary and unnecessary” because of the Court’s insistence on 
individualized sentencing in capital cases.105  The Court recognized that 
“[a] central feature of death penalty sentencing is a particular assessment 
of the circumstances of the crime and the characteristics of the 
offender.”106  That system, the Court explained, “is designed to consider 
both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including youth.”107  The 
Court found that system wanting, however, when applied to juvenile 
offenders because “[a]n unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality 
or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower 
mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course.”108  That 
possibility existed, the Court said, “even where the juvenile offender’s 
objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should 
require a sentence less severe than death.”109 
 
 101.  See, e.g., The Supreme Court 2009 Term Leading Cases: Eighth Amendment—Juvenile 
Life Without Parole Sentences, 124 HARV. L. REV. 209, 217 (2010) (arguing that “the higher 
culpability of murder has never before trumped considerations of the lessened culpability of a class 
of murderers” and that the Court should exercise its independent judgment to abolish all life without 
parole sentences). 
 102.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012). 
 103.  Id. at 2460. 
 104.  See infra text accompanying notes 105-149. 
 105.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2005). 
 106.  Id. at 572. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 573. 
 109.  Id. 
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss2/6
ARTICLE 6 - BERKHEISER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2013  7:32 PM 
2013] DEVELOPMENTAL DETOUR 503 
Roper recognized what developmental psychologists110 and the 
Court111 itself have long known: that juveniles are categorically different 
from adults and are, therefore, less culpable for the crimes they 
commit.112  Because juveniles are more susceptible than adults to 
immature and irresponsible behavior, “‘their irresponsible conduct is not 
as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.’”113  Moreover, the 
vulnerability and lack of control that are a hallmark of youth “mean 
juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to 
escape negative influences in their whole environments.”114  Because 
juveniles are at a stage of life where they are still struggling to define 
their unique identities, “it is less supportable to conclude that even a 
heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably 
depraved character.”115  Finally, “from a moral standpoint, it would be 
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a 
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be 
reformed.”116  The differences between juvenile and adult offenders, the 
Court concluded, are “too marked and well understood to risk allowing a 
youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient 
culpability.”117  Only a rule placing all juveniles off limits, the Court 
concluded,118 would protect them from the possibility of a death 
 
 110.  Id. at 569 (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992) (“[A]dolescents are overrepresented statistically 
in virtually every category of reckless behavior”); Laurence B. Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less 
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the 
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1012 (2003) (“[A]s legal minors, [juveniles] 
lack the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting”)). 
 111.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (the 
reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also 
explains why “their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult”); 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact.  It 
is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to 
psychological damage. . . .  Even the normal 16-year old customarily lacks the maturity of an 
adult”)). 
 112.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70 (“Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and 
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst 
offenders”). 
 113.  Id. at 570 (citing Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835 (plurality opinion)). 
 114.  Id. (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 572-73. 
 118.  Id. at 570-71 (“In Thompson, a plurality of the Court recognized the import of these 
characteristics [differences between juveniles and adults] with respect to juveniles under 16, and 
relied on them to hold that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on 
juveniles below that age.  We conclude that the same reasoning applies to all juvenile offenders 
under 18”) (internal citation omitted). 
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sentence despite their diminished culpability.119  The answer was to 
adopt a categorical ban on the juvenile death penalty, and so the Court 
did just that.120 
Five years later, the Court was asked to apply Roper to the case of a 
seventeen-year-old who had been sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole for an armed burglary he had taken part in with 
three other teenagers in Jacksonville, Florida.121  Following the lead of 
Christopher Simmons, whose appeal had brought about the abolition of 
the juvenile death penalty,122 Terrance Graham challenged the entire 
sentencing practice of condemning juvenile nonhomicide offenders to 
life in prison.123  That challenge propelled the Court into new territory, 
for it never before had considered a categorical challenge to a “term-of-
years sentence.”124  The novelty of the claim did not deter the Graham 
Court.  The approach in the noncapital sentencing precedents, while 
“suited for considering a gross proportionality challenge to a particular 
defendant’s sentence,”125 was inappropriate for Graham because he had 
thrown an entire sentencing practice into question.126  The Court 
signaled the difference between Graham’s case and all of its earlier 
term-of-years challenges when it stated that “[t]his case implicates a 
particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of 
offenders.”127  Although the Court had always before limited its 
categorical rulings to death penalty cases,128 with Graham it was those 
 
 119.  Id. at 571. 
 120.  Id. at 574.  There is more than a hint of irony in the fact the sentences of the juvenile 
offenders on death row would be converted to life without parole.  See Feld, supra note 92, at 21-
22; Elizabeth Cepparulo, Roper v. Simmons: Unveiling Juvenile Purgatory: Is Life Really Better 
Than Death?, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 225 (2006) (“In many states, life without parole 
and death are the only two options when sentencing homicide offenders”).  See, e.g., Duncan v. 
State, 922 So. 2d 245, 252 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (remanding, based on Roper, to set aside 
Duncan’s sentence of death and to resentence him to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole—the only other sentence available for a defendant convicted of capital murder); Lecroy v. 
State, 954 So. 2d 747, 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming trial court’s decision to conform 
Lecroy’s sentence to the state supreme court’s specifications—life without the possibility of parole 
for twenty-five years). 
 121.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010). 
 122.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79. 
 123.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23. 
 124.  Id. at 2022. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 2022-23. 
 128.  See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (eschewing reliance on death penalty 
cases that applied proportionality principles because “a sentence of death differs in kind from any 
other sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long”).  But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-
88 (1983) (tracing history of proportionality rules and concluding that Eighth Amendment does not 
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cases, and not the Court’s noncapital proportionality precedents, that 
governed the resolution of Graham’s appeal.129 
To reach its categorical ruling, the Court in Graham considered and 
systematically rejected other alternatives.  The State of Florida argued 
that its laws and the laws of other states “take sufficient account of the 
age of a juvenile offender.”130  The Court acknowledged the relevance of 
an offender’s age to the Eighth Amendment analysis, but was concerned 
that “[n]othing in Florida’s laws prevents its courts from sentencing a 
juvenile nonhomicide offender to life without parole based on a 
subjective judgment that the defendant’s crimes demonstrate an 
‘irretrievably depraved character.’”131  That, the Court said, “is 
inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment.”132 
The Court next considered an approach holding that the Eighth 
Amendment requires sentencers to “take the offender’s age into 
consideration as part of a case-specific gross disproportionality inquiry, 
weighing it against the seriousness of the crime.”133  Such an approach 
to sentencing must, the Court said, “be confined by some boundaries.  
The dilemma of juvenile sentencing demonstrates this.”134  The problem 
with a case-by-case proportionality analysis, the Court reasoned, is that 
courts cannot “with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible 
juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for change.”135  
 
suggest any distinction between types of punishments, but forbids excessiveness in all 
punishments). 
 129.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23. 
 130.  Id. at 2030-31 (noting Florida’s arguments that prosecutors are required to charge sixteen 
and seventeen year olds as adults “only for certain serious felonies,” and that Florida “in only the 
narrowest of circumstances” imposes no age limit for trial of juveniles as adults). 
 131.  Id. at 2031 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005). 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 2031-32. 
 135.  Id. at 2032 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 573) (“[A]n ‘unacceptable likelihood exists that the 
brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments 
based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, 
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death’”)).  See 
Ethan Bronner, Sentencing Ruling Reflects Rethinking on Juvenile Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 
2012, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/us/news-analysis-ruling-reflects-
rethinking-on-juvenile-justice.html?pagewanted=all (reporting on a study conducted by 
developmental psychologist Laurence Steinberg of 1,300 young convicted felons over a period of 
seven years, at the conclusion of which Steinberg was “unable to predict which ones would be the 
10 percent” who become adult offenders).  See also Brief of Former Juvenile Court Judges as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646 & 10-
9647), 2012 WL 135044 (“Based on decades of experience sentencing juvenile offenders, amici 
simply do not believe it is possible to tell which youths will change and which will not at the time of 
their initial sentencing.”). 
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Given that the differences between juveniles and adults are so “‘marked 
and well understood,’”136 a case-by-case approach presented too great a 
risk that a juvenile would receive a sentence of life without parole 
“‘despite insufficient culpability.’”137 
Moreover, Graham reasoned, case-specific sentencing does not 
take account of the “special difficulties encountered by counsel in 
juvenile representation.”138  The Court relied on amici for its recognition 
that “[j]uveniles mistrust adults”139 and are “less likely than adults to 
work effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense.”140  The 
problems juveniles face in their lawyer-client relationships stem from 
“[d]ifficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding 
impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel seen as part of the 
adult world a rebellious youth rejects.”141  All of those difficulties likely 
“impair the quality of a juvenile defendant’s representation.”142  A 
categorical rule, the Court concluded, avoids the risk that those same 
difficulties will cause “a court or jury [to] erroneously conclude that a 
particular juvenile is sufficiently culpable to deserve life without parole 
for a nonhomicide.”143 
Finally, with a categorical rule, all juvenile nonhomicide offenders 
will have “a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.”144  The same 
concerns as in Roper applied to sentences of life without parole: “Life in 
prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment 
outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.  
Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation 
for remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation.”145  A young person who knows 
he has no chance of leaving prison often is twice denied an opportunity 
 
 136.  Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2032 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572-73).  Studies since Graham 
have confirmed the differences between juveniles and adults that were significant to the Court in 
both Roper and Graham. See Brief for J. Lawrence Aber et al. for Petitioners, supra note 55 
(presenting the work and views of psychologists, social scientists, and neuroscientists). 
 137.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572-73). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. (citing Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund et al. as Amici Curiae 7-
12).  See also Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the 
Role of Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 272-73 (2005). 
 140.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (“Mentally retarded defendants 
may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel”)). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id.  See, e.g., Smith & Cohen, supra note 38, at 92 (“Graham’s most significant role may 
be its recognition of redemption as an Eighth Amendment constitutional principle, rejecting a 
legislative determination that entire classes of individuals were irredeemable.”). 
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to change.  First, the very term of his imprisonment leaves him “little 
incentive to become a responsible individual.”146  Second, the system 
itself often “becomes complicit in the lack of development” by denying 
counseling, education, and rehabilitation programs to those who will 
never leave prison.147  To avoid “the perverse consequence in which the 
lack of maturity that led to an offender’s crime is reinforced by the 
prison term,”148 a categorical rule against life without parole for 
nonhomicide offenders was necessary.149 
The rationale that had led the Court in both Roper and Graham to 
adopt categorical rules and to reject case-by-case sentencing of juveniles 
was plainly before the Miller Court.  Yet instead of adopting it or 
explaining why it did not hold in the cases before it, the Court in Miller 
took a decided detour, adopting its reasoning about adolescent 
differences from adults but not the necessary results of that reasoning, as 
counseled in both Roper and Graham.  The harm that the unprincipled 
decision in Miller’s has (and will) wrought is not hypothetical.  As 
Roper and Graham could have foretold, those who seek resentencing 
under Miller will face a head-on collision with everything those cases 
warned against.  What that collision is likely to look like is the subject of 
the next section. 
IV. UNSOUND 
In addition to being unprincipled, the Court’s endorsement in 
Miller’s of case-by-case individualized sentencing for juvenile homicide 
offenders is unsound.150  We need look no further than the facts of 
Roper, Graham, and Miller to understand just how unsound the ruling is. 
Roper was the first Supreme Court opinion to recognize the dangers 
of individualized sentencing for juveniles.  Christopher Simmons, the 
juvenile petitioner in Roper, had no juvenile charges or adjudications 
and no prior adult criminal convictions at the time he was tried for the 
 
 146.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
 147.  Id. at 2032-33. 
 148.  Id. at 2033. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Even the reliance of the Court in Miller on Eddings v. Oklahoma, see supra text 
accompanying notes 57-62, was a fool’s errand.  Upon remand by the Supreme Court for 
consideration of all the mitigating factors in young Eddings’s life, he was resentenced to death.  
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 688 P.2d 342 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1984).  Ultimately, the Oklahoma Court 
of Criminal Appeals, citing statutory limitations on such remands, modified Eddings’ death 
sentence and remanded to the county district court to sentence him to life without parole, the only 
option under the controlling state law.  Id. at 343. 
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murder that condemned him to death row.151  At his sentencing, 
Simmons’s parents, his two young half-brothers, and two friends 
described their loving relationships with him and various acts of 
kindness he had performed.152  In closing argument, Simmons’s counsel 
asserted that Simmons’s kind acts, his lack of any prior criminal history, 
and his age at the time of the crime were mitigating factors that 
counseled against the death penalty.153  Against that placid backdrop, the 
facts surrounding Christopher Simmons’s crime were chilling.  Before 
he committed murder, Simmons told his friends that he wanted to kill 
someone.154  He outlined in detail what would become the actual crime: 
he would “commit burglary and murder, by breaking and entering, tying 
up a victim, and throwing the victim off a bridge.”155  Simmons, then 
seventeen, and his fifteen-year old accomplice did exactly that.156  After 
entering the victim’s home through an open window, they duct-taped her 
eyes, mouth, and hands, put her in her minivan, took her to a railroad 
trestle spanning the Meramec River, tied her feet and hands together 
with electrical wire, wrapped her entire face with duct tape, and threw 
her off the bridge, where they left her to drown.157  By anyone’s 
standards, this was a truly monstrous crime. 
The fact that juveniles committed the murder could well draw a gut 
reaction of horror that anyone so young could do something so awful.  
But the Constitution does not permit subjective gut reactions to define 
the sentencing of our young.  In explaining why the Eighth Amendment 
required a categorical rule disallowing the death penalty for juveniles, 
Roper recognized that “[i]n some cases a defendant’s youth may even be 
counted against him.”158  In fact, the prosecutor at Christopher 
Simmons’s trial had argued in rebuttal that his youth was aggravating 
rather than mitigating:159 “‘Age, he says.  Think about age.  Seventeen 
years old.  Isn’t that scary?  Doesn’t that scare you?  Mitigating?  Quite 
the contrary, I submit.  Quite the contrary.’”160  It is precisely because of 
 
 151.  Brief for Respondent at 4 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 
WL 1947812 at *2-5. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 556. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at 556-57 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. at 573. 
 159.  Id.  Simmons is not the only case in which prosecutors have portrayed youth as 
aggravating.  See Ashley Dobbs, The Use of Youth as an Aggravating Factor in Death Penalty 
Cases Involving Minors, 10 JUV. JUST. UPDATE 1, 14-15 (June/July 2004) (collecting examples). 
 160.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 558. 
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the possibility of that kind of visceral appeal that rules requiring 
consideration of the mitigating effect of youth at sentencing were 
insufficient to address the Roper Court’s “larger concerns” and required 
a categorical ban on the juvenile death penalty.161 
Central to those concerns was the undeniable truth that even expert 
psychologists have great difficulty differentiating between “the juvenile 
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”162  It is 
that difficulty, the Court went on to say, that has led to the “rule 
forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing any patient under eighteen as 
having antisocial personality disorder, a disorder also referred to as 
psychopathy or sociopathy, and which is characterized by callousness, 
cynicism, and contempt for the feelings, rights, and suffering of 
others.”163  The Court concluded that if trained experts feel constrained 
to refrain from labeling our youth with such a diagnosis, “States should 
refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnation—that a 
juvenile offender merits the death penalty.”164 
Similarly, after explaining why the laws of the State of Florida did 
not meet Eighth Amendment requirements, the Graham Court illustrated 
the Eighth Amendment problem with the State’s argument by referring 
to what had happened to Terrance Graham.165  The judge who sentenced 
Graham imposed a greater sentence than the prosecutor had requested 
because he concluded that Graham was “incorrigible.”166  He stated: 
“[Y]ou decided that this is how you are going to lead your life and that 
there is nothing we can do for you. . . .  We can’t do anything to deter 
you.”167  The judge rendered this terminal decision despite evidence that 
Terrance Graham “most likely suffered a form of cocaine addiction at 
 
 161.  Id. at 573. 
 162.  Id. (citing Laurence B. Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of 
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death 
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014-16 (2003)). 
 163.  Id. (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 701-06 (4th ed. text rev. 2000)). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2031 (2010).  The Court also recited what the 
sentencing judge had said when he sentenced thirteen-year old Joe Sullivan to life without parole.  
See id. (citing Brief of Respondent at 6 Sullivan v. Florida, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009) (No. 08-7621), 
2009 WL 2954164 at *6 (stating that Sullivan had been given “opportunity after opportunity to 
upright himself,” but had demonstrated that he was “unwilling to follow the law and needed to be 
kept away from society for the duration of his life”).  Sullivan v. Florida was argued the same day 
as Graham, but the Court later dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.  Graham, 
130 S. Ct. at 2031.  Nonetheless, the facts were significant to the Court.  See id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. (quoting Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d 43, 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. April 10, 2008)). 
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birth”168 and was plagued by “long-term depression,”169 while both of 
his parents were addicted to crack cocaine.170  In elementary school, 
“Graham was diagnosed as suffering from ADHD, but his mother told 
him not to take the prescribed medication” (Ritalin).171  “Graham wanted 
to move out of his home as soon as possible so as not to be around his 
father, who was unemployed”172 and still smoking crack cocaine.173  
Aside from the drug addiction, Graham’s father and his siblings had a 
history of problems with the law, including time in prison and juvenile 
detention facilities.174  Without the guiding hand of a beneficent court or 
a law that recognized all of the complexities involved in sentencing 
youth, Terrance Graham stood very little chance at becoming a 
productive and responsible citizen. 
The judge’s subjective judgment that Terrance Graham was 
“irredeemably depraved”175 strikes at the heart of what the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits in the sentencing of juveniles.176  What the Court 
in Roper and Graham understood was that even all the advances in our 
understanding of youth from the social sciences and neuroscience could 
not prevent the power of a horrible murder from overwhelming the 
sentencing determination.  The knowledge from MRI studies about brain 
development and the work of our best developmental psychologists 
about the stark differences between juveniles and adults, even when 
coupled with a mitigation story that would make one weep, would not, 
the Court knew, outweigh the often horrific facts of a terrible crime 
committed by juveniles.  It was for these reasons that the Court in Roper 
and Graham wrested that decision from the sentencers and declared that 
certain sentences are cruel and unusual when imposed on juveniles as a 
categorical matter.  Now Miller, with its mandate of individualized 
consideration at sentencing, reopens the door to all of the malignity of 
subjective decision-making and its fruits. 
Just how wrong a sentencing process can go is evident in the stories 
that Evan Miller’s and Kuntrell Jackson’s resentencing hearings are 
 
 168.  Brief for Petitioner at 11 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412), 2009 
WL 2159655 at *11. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. at *11. 
 172.  Id. at *11-12. 
 173.  Id. at *11. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031. 
 176.  Id. 
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likely to tell.177  Miller’s mitigation story is compelling.  From an early 
age, he was the target of severe beatings by his father and made his first 
of six suicide attempts at the tender age of five, when he tried to hang 
himself.178  Both of his parents were alcoholics, and Miller’s mother also 
was addicted to illegal drugs.179  By the time he was eight years old, 
Miller had begun drinking and using drugs.180  From that age forward, 
he received mental health treatment intermittently at a number of 
treatment centers.181  At age ten, the state removed Miller and his 
siblings from their family home and placed them in foster care.182  
Following his parents’ divorce a few years later, the state returned Miller 
to the care of his drug-addicted mother, and Miller followed in her 
footsteps, becoming deeply drug addicted himself.183 
This was the setting into which their 52-year-old neighbor inserted 
himself when he came to Miller’s home late at night to do a drug deal 
with Miller’s mother.184  Miller, then fourteen, and his sixteen-year old 
friend went with the neighbor back to his house for a night of drinking 
and drugs.185  Considering all of the factors affecting adolescent 
decision-making and behavior as outlined in Roper and Graham, 
particularly when in the company of an older peer, what Miller would do 
that night can best be understood as the drug-addled, impulse-driven, 
peer-approval-seeking actions of a terribly misguided youth. 
In its opposition to Miller’s petition for a writ of certiorari, the State 
of Alabama focused on a distinctly different set of facts than Miller’s 
mitigation story—the details of the crime of which Miller was 
convicted.186  The State characterized the killing of Miller’s neighbor as 
“among the most gruesome and intolerable crimes a human being can 
commit.”187  The State described in detail Miller’s hitting of the man 
with his fists and a baseball bat, and his continuing to beat him with the 
 
 177.  See Ashley Nellis, The Lives of Juvenile Lifers: Findings from a National Survey, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT (Mar. 2012), 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_The_Lives_of_Juvenile_Lifers.pdf. 
 178.  Miller Petition, supra note 9, at 5. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. at 5. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. at 6. 
 186.  Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition at 2-3 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 
(2012) (No. 10-9646), 2011 WL 5322572 at *2-3. 
 187.  Id. at 2. 
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bat “‘everywhere’” as the man was screaming.188  When he stopped 
hitting him with the bat, the State recites Miller’s friend’s testimony that 
Miller then put a sheet over the man’s head and said, “I am God, I’ve 
come to take your life,” before hitting him with the bat once more and 
then going home.189  Miller and his friend soon returned and set two 
couches on fire, in words his friend attributed to Miller, “‘to cover up the 
evidence.’”190  A full autopsy revealed that the man died of smoke 
inhalation, with multiple blunt force injuries as a contributing factor 
making it more difficult for him to breathe in the fire.191  The State 
concluded by arguing, based on those facts, that this murder, while rare 
for a fourteen-year old, made appropriate the imposition of a life without 
parole sentence on someone so young.192 
Kuntrell Jackson, like Evan Miller, was fourteen on the evening in 
November 1999 when he and two other boys decided to rob a video 
store in Blytheville, Arkansas.193  The boys never discussed bringing a 
weapon with them, but on the way to the store, Jackson learned that one 
of the boys had a sawed-off shotgun hidden in his coat sleeve.194  When 
they arrived at the store, Jackson remained outside while the other two 
went in.195  The gunman pointed his weapon at the store clerk and 
demanded money from the cash register; the clerk told him she did not 
have any money.196  Shortly after that, Jackson entered the store and 
yelled out “‘we ain’t playin’’ or ‘I thought you all was playin’’” just in 
time to see his friend shoot the store clerk in the face after she refused to 
hand over the money and threatened to call the police.197 
It is hardly surprising that Jackson ended up at a robbery gone bad 
that night.  He was raised in public housing projects in an impoverished 
community known for its drugs and violence.198  His father abandoned 
the family before Jackson was born.199  His mother went to prison for 
 
 188.  Id. at 3. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. at 6. 
 192.  Id. at 19. 
 193.  Adam Liptak & Ethan Bronner, Justices Bar Mandatory Life Terms for Juveniles, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 25, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/us/justices-bar-mandatory-
life-sentences-for-juveniles.html; Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Ark. 2004). 
 194.  Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 758. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 758-59. 
 197.  Id. at 759-60. 
 198.  Jackson Petition, supra note 9, at 4. 
 199.  Id. 
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shooting and injuring a neighbor when Jackson was six,200 and seven 
years later, his older brother was also imprisoned for shooting 
someone.201  Two of his sisters became pregnant in their teens, and 
several other relatives were incarcerated.202  The presiding judge at 
Jackon’s preliminary hearing described Jackson’s mental capacity as 
“‘borderline or near borderline,’” placing his mental functioning “at the 
fourth percentile compared to children his age.”203  Even the criminal 
justice system seemed to have conspired against him, for despite him not 
being the trigger-man, the jury convicted Jackson of capital felony 
murder, and the judge sentenced him to a mandatory term of life without 
parole.204 
In the eyes of jurors, the telling of Miller’s and Jackson’s stories, 
replete with mitigating factors, likely will pale in comparison to the 
cold-blooded nature of the crimes they committed.205  One can well 
imagine the members of the jury recoiling with disgust from the facts of 
the crimes.  No measure of mitigation or understanding of adolescent 
development is likely to overcome the raw, visceral repulsion that is the 
natural response to what Miller and his friend did or to what Jackson and 
his friends did.206  Thus, far from removing subjectivity from the 
sentencing process, Miller injects it into the very heart of sentencing.  It 
was just that kind of subjectivity that Roper and Graham sought to 
exclude from sentencing determinations for juveniles by establishing 
categorical prohibitions against certain penalties.  By paying lip service 
to the principles that drove the decisions in Roper and Graham, Miller 
does a disservice to all juvenile homicide offenders who received 
 
 200.  Id. at 5. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. at 4 
 204.  Id. at 6. 
 205.  Even though he was not the trigger-man, Jackson’s spontaneous shouting out of words 
that could be interpreted as “we ain’t playin’” could also lead to the conclusion that it was those 
words that compelled the shooter to shoot.  Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Ark. 2004). 
 206.  The stories of the juvenile offenders who were sentenced to death before Roper are to 
similar effect.  Each case received the individualized sentencing required by Woodson and Lockett 
since the 1970s, and yet all were sentenced to death for crimes they committed before they were 
eighteen.  See, e.g., Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1227 (10th Cir. 2002) (affirming death sentence 
despite mitigating factors including defendant’s youth, his young emotional and mental age, his lack 
of blameworthiness, his domination by an older co-defendant, his history of drug usage, a “‘[f]ear 
reaction to finding himself in a fugitive/captive situation,’” his lack of personal participation in the 
criminal acts compared to his co-defendant, his attempts to physically absent himself from the scene 
of the crime, and his family history, where the state alleged three aggravating factors: knowingly 
creating a risk of death to more than one person, the especially heinous and cruel nature of the 
murders, and the probability that Hain would be a continuing threat to society).   
25
Berkheiser: Developmental Detour
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
ARTICLE 6 - BERKHEISER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2013  7:32 PM 
514 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:489 
mandatory sentences of life without parole.  While Miller provides them 
the opportunity to seek a lesser sentence, it does nothing to ensure that 
the new sentencing determination is the product of sound and principled 
decision-making.  It is an essentially hollow promise devoid of any 
moral meaning.  One is left to wonder why the Miller Court ruled as it 
did. 
V. MISGUIDED CAUTION 
Perhaps the decision to take the narrower path of overruling only 
the mandatory imposition of life without parole on juveniles and not the 
sentence itself was the Court’s exercise of its minimalist inclinations.207  
It was those inclinations that had fueled Justice O’Connor’s dissent in 
Roper208 and Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in Graham,209 but 
somehow eluded Justice Kennedy and those who joined his majority 
opinions in both cases.210  In the main, however, the Court has embraced 
 
 207.  See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 56, at xi; David Brooks, Modesty and 
Audacity, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A25, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/opinion/modesty-and-audacity.html (describing Justice 
Roberts’s majority opinion in the health care law case as an exercise in “minimalism and self-
control” that was a positive development for the law and the people).  But see Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding, in sweeping terms, that the First Amendment 
prohibited the federal government from restricting independent political expenditures by 
corporations and unions). 
 208.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 602-03 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that proportionality concerns raised in the case “may properly be addressed not by means of an 
arbitrary, categorical age-based rule, but rather through individualized sentencing in which juries 
are required to give appropriate mitigating weight to the defendant’s immaturity, his susceptibility 
to outside pressures, his cognizance of the consequences of his actions, and so forth.”). 
 209.  See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(agreeing that Graham’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, but advocating reliance on 
existing precedents allowing for consideration of the particular defendant and particular crime at 
issue, rather than creating a new constitutional rule, as the majority had done). 
 210.  See Id. at 2034 (majority opinion) (“The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life 
without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 
578 (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders 
who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”).  Of course, the minimalist 
preference of the Roberts Court has not carried the day in every case.  The Court has had its 
perfectionist moments.  Cass R. Sunstein, Minimal Appeal: Minimalism v. Fundamentalism, THE 
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 1, 2005, at 17, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/minimal-
appeal# (explaining that perfectionist judges want to interpret the Constitution to promote individual 
rights).  Without that more expansive approach, we would not have Roper or Graham, or the new-
found judicial attention to juveniles’ distinctive characteristics.  See David S. Tanenhaus, The 
Roberts Court’s Liberal Turn on Juvenile Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/the-roberts-courts-liberal-turn-on-juvenile-justice.html 
(tracing history of juvenile justice and expressing a pleasant surprise in the Roberts Court’s 
resuscitati[on of] the juvenile court ideal of individualized justice for children). 
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judicial minimalism over the past two decades, generating decisions that 
answer the narrowest question before the Court, and nothing more.211 
On the Roberts Court, all but the Court’s two most conservative 
jurists have embraced judicial minimalism in one form or another.212  
However, that does not mean that the seven remaining Justices embrace 
the same views.  “[T]he minimalist camp is large and diverse.  The point 
is that they greatly prefer nudges to earthquakes.”213  Rather than 
adopting theories, minimalists decide cases.214  With judicial 
minimalism the Justices “hope to do no more than is necessary to resolve 
cases.”215  “[M]inimalists tend to favor decisions that are [both] narrow, 
in the sense that they do not want to resolve issues not before the 
Court . . . [and] shallow, in the sense that they avoid the largest 
theoretical controversies.”216  Chief Justice Roberts’s own words may 
 
 211.  See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1454 (2000) (explaining that a resurgence in judicial minimalism has been endorsed by former 
and current judges and has sparked scholarly debate); Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: 
Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298 (1998) (explaining the 
virtues of judicial minimalism). 
 212.  See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 56, at 9 (writing that the “analytical 
heart” of the Court at the time—Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—was 
cut of minimalist cloth); Joshua Dunn, The Spirit Is Partially Willing: The Legal Realism and Half-
Hearted Minimalism of President Obama, in CAROL MCNAMARA & MELANIE M. MARLOWE, THE 
OBAMA PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: A FIRST LOOK 101-02 (2011) (commenting 
on President Obama’s selection of Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan for the Supreme Court as 
reflections of a minimalist attitude); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice: Reflections 
on Roe v. Wade, in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 194 (David M. O’Brien ed., 
2003) (suggesting, in true minimalist fashion, that a less ambitious decision than Roe v. Wade 
simply striking down the Texas abortion statute would have avoided much of the post-Roe 
controversy); Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, supra note 210, at 17 (commenting on Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s recent retirement and the nomination of federal appeals judge John Roberts to replace 
her and concluding after examining Judge Roberts’s record that he likely would continue in 
O’Connor’s minimalist footsteps); Ronald Dworkin, Justice Sotomayor: The Unjust Hearings, N.Y. 
REV. OF BOOKS, Sept. 24, 2009, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/sep/24/justice-sotomayor-the-unjust-
hearings/?pagination=false (reacting to a sense of a missed opportunity at Justice Sotomayor’s 
confirmation hearings to embrace and defend a more conventionally activist liberal form of judicial 
review); David D. Kirkpatrick, Judge’s Mentor: Part Guide, Part Foil, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2009, 
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/us/politics/22mentors.html?pagewanted=all 
(portraying Judge Sotomayor as a judicial minimalist and quoting former Yale Law Dean and 
Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi, who described Sotomayor’s approach in a controversial case 
as one of “judicial minimalism”); Scott Lemieux, Standing for Me, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (June 
25, 2007), http://prospect.org.article/standing-me (critiquing the Court’s 5-4 decision in Hein v. 
Freedom from Religion Association and Justice Alito’s preference for minimalism over overruling 
Flast v. Cohen, a preference that Justice Scalia did not share). 
 213.  Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, supra note 210. 
 214.  SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 56, at 9. 
 215.  Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, supra note 210. 
 216.  Cass R. Sunstein, Of Snakes and Butterflies: A Reply, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2234, 2242 
27
Berkheiser: Developmental Detour
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
ARTICLE 6 - BERKHEISER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2013  7:32 PM 
516 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:489 
best sum up his Court’s minimalism: “If it is not necessary to decide 
more to dispose of a case, in my view it is necessary not to decide 
more.”217 
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Miller was not as narrow as it 
might have been.  The Court could have decided, on the facts of the 
cases before it, informed by a “common sense” understanding of the 
limitations and pitfalls of adolescence,218 that Evan Miller and Kuntrell 
Jackson did not deserve to die in prison, and reserved for another day 
any broader ruling.  That would have been the narrowest of minimalist 
decisions as described above.  But the Court’s decision to limit its ruling 
to the mandatory nature of the sentencing, while leaving intact the 
sentence itself, also was a minimalist ruling.  By steering clear of an 
outright prohibition on life without parole for juveniles convicted of 
homicide, the Court avoided larger questions of juvenile culpability and 
penal proportionality.  Those questions are left to play out in the 
courtrooms of twenty-eight states and the federal government,219 as 
those under mandatory life without parole sentences exercise their Miller 
right to an individualized determination of the appropriate sentence for 
each and every one of them.  The enormous costs of all the decisions in 
the twenty-nine jurisdictions where mandatory life without parole was 
imposed on those under eighteen will be a direct consequence of the 
Court’s failure to adopt a broader ruling like those in Roper and 
Graham.  Minimalism has its costs, and they are calculable.220 
It is in courtrooms across the country that the harsh mischief of 
minimalism will run its course, with outcomes uncertain and a life 
outside prison walls a mere hope.  Predictability is an important value in 
our criminal law, and nowhere is predictability more important than in 
sentencing.221  But “minimalist rulings make predictability impossible to 
 
(2006). 
 217.  Cass R. Sunstein, The Minimalist, L.A. TIMES, at B11 (May 25, 2006) (quoting Hon. 
John G. Roberts, Jr., Commencement Address, Chief Justice Roberts 2006 Commencement Address 
(Geo. U. L. Ctr. May 21, 2006) (webcast available at 
www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventDetail.cfm?eventID=144)). 
 218.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012). 
 219.  Id. at 2471 (twenty-eight states and the federal government make life without parole 
mandatory for some juveniles convicted of murder). 
 220.  See Wexler, supra note 211, at 312-13 (“As the Court announces a greater number of 
minimalist decisions, the burden on lower courts and advocates rises, and one could speculate that at 
some point these costs begin having a serious effect on the work of these courts and practitioners.  
Perhaps more important, however, is the effect of excessive minimalism upon the public’s and 
media’s perception of the Court’s legitimacy.”). 
 221.  See Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and 
Expertise, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1628 (2012) (critiquing state sentencing guidelines and 
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achieve.”222  Indeed, when predictability is an important value, the 
narrowness of minimalism “can be a big mistake”223 and “in some 
domains, minimalism is a terrible blunder.”224  With its minimalist 
ruling, the Miller Court has made either a big mistake or a terrible 
blunder.  Unfortunately, the lives of the two thousand prisoners225 
serving mandatory life without parole sentences for murders committed 
when they were not yet old enough to vote depended on Miller to be 
neither a big mistake nor a terrible blunder.  The system failed them 
once again. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court had the opportunity in Miller to advance its 
“kids are different” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence by declaring all 
sentences of life without parole out of bounds for those convicted of 
crimes committed when they were under eighteen years of age.  Rather 
than seize that opportunity, the Court squandered it, handing down a 
perfunctory ruling that takes the small step of outlawing mandatory 
sentences of life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders, while 
shying away from a bold stride like those in Roper and Graham.  By 
detouring around a categorical ruling against all life without parole 
sentences for juveniles, the Court rejected a rule that would have 
afforded both uniformity and predictability to a process that is fraught 
with opportunities for prejudice and error.  The worst of it is that those 
who were sentenced to die in prison when they were as young as 
fourteen may yet be re-condemned to live out that sentence. 
 
 
remarking that “[a]s in the federal system, states have been able to increase the predictability and 
uniformity of their sentencing through guidelines”); Michael McNeill, Crack, Congress, and the 
Normalization of Federal Sentencing: Why 12,040 Federal Inmates Believe That Their Sentences 
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1360 (2012) (discussing the convergence of the fight against the “crack epidemic” and the United 
States Sentencing Commission’s adoption of federal sentencing guidelines to promote uniformity 
and predictability in federal criminal sentencing). 
 222.  Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825, 825 (2008). 
 223.  Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1909-10 (2006) 
(discussing problems with narrowness). 
 224.  Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, supra note 222, at 825. 
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